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, than is validation. Generally constructing a proof requires that more diverse ideas come to mind at the "right time" than validating it does. Also, like most reading, validation normally emphasizes proceeding linearly from the beginning to the end of a written proof-perhaps repeated several times. This linear order is unlikely to occur in proof construction. Given a theorem to prove, one must often attend not only to the beginning but also to the end of a proof before developing the middle. In addition, many proofs have a hierarchical structure based on subproofs and subconstructions that emerges during the process of proof construction. Even assuming an idealized prover (one making no mistakes or false starts, which is an inherently unrealistic assumption), such an emergent hierarchical structure may lead to generating subarguments in an order very different from that of the final written text. Indeed, for the working mathematician, a theorem and its proof sometimes emerge in a dialectical way over a long period of time, with adjustments in one alternating with adjustments in the other.
One distinction between current ideas of reading and that of validation is that written proofs are still seen as carrying considerable meaning. The proofs themselves (as opposed to their readers or authors) are regarded by mathematicians as the ultimate establishers of the truth of theorems.4 One examines neither the life and times of a proof s author nor the sophistication of its readers in judging the truth of a theorem. Perhaps this is partly because any expanded or altered argument constructed by a validator is often seen as closely aligned with the original written proof, so that the original proof is deemed correct (in some general sense) provided the expanded, validator-generated text is seen by the validator as correct.
Another distinction between validation and reading in general appears to be the unusual degree of agreement about the correctness of arguments and the truth of theorems arising from the validation process. It is our experience that if two mathematicians disagree on the correctness of a proof, they will often attempt a joint validation of it (or a fragment of it). Typically, they will either expand the proof and agree on the expanded version or, failing that, they will find and agree on a mistake that cannot be fixed. Occasionally, they may find and correct small errors that they agree are insignificant and do not affect the overall correctness of the argument. This ability to reach agreement appears to depend to some extent on the way that mathematical definitions have come to be treated as more or less unchallengeable in the 20th century.
Today, definitions in mathematics are typically treated as analytic, as reducible to undefined terms except for foundational considerations, such as the meaning of set, element, or integer. Such considerations are not major issues for most mathematicians perhaps partly because "normal" foundations yield a mathematics that can be interpreted as paralleling an intuitive view of the world developed socially from an early age. With both "normal" foundations and an intuitive view one can consider several objects together, count them, add, measure things, and so on.' In contrast with analytic definitions, synthetic definitions6 are the everyday definitions that are commonly found in dictionaries-they are often ill-specified descriptions of things that already exist. It may be unclear when such everyday definitions (e.g., of democracy) are "complete" or whether attention to all aspects of them is essential for their proper use. Analytic definitions, however, bring concepts into existence-the concept (e.g., of group as used in mathematics) is whatever the definition says it is, nothing more and nothing less. One cannot safely ignore any aspects of such definitions. There is a sense in which synthetic definitions can be "wrong," that is, they can be inaccurate descriptions, but analytic definitions cannot, since nothing is being described. ' For example, our synthetic definition of validation could be wrong; we might have inaccurately described what we claimed is a recurring phenomenon. In contrast, few mathematicians would say the analytic definition of "group" was wrong-uninteresting, tasteless, lacking applications, or inaccurately remembered perhaps, but not wrong. Today's use of analytic definitions renders validations (and proofs and theorems) very reliable, whereas the earlier use of synthetic definitions sometimes left them problematic. This situation can be seen in Proofs and Refutations (Lakatos, 1976) where validations appear inherently unreliable, that is, unreliable even if there are no errors. There, theorems have proofs and refutations (counterexamples) apparently due to treating definitions as synthetic and hence challengeable. Given some literary license, Proofs and Refutations provides a fairly accurate description of the way that some mathematics developed historically. It illustrates how definitions and results can coevolve, but the compression of time involved in its fictional narration, together with its synthetic treatment of definitions, may suggest that validations, proofs, and theorems are far less reliable than they really are today.
Roles Played by Validation
Although we are focusing here on the validation abilities and practices of undergraduates who are in at least their 2nd year of mathematics study, validation 5 However, nothing in principle restricts mathematicians to particular foundations. For example, in intuitionist/constructivist mathematics, one forgoes mathematical induction and the logical law of the excluded middle, resulting in a more limited mathematics without proofs by induction or contradiction.
6 Our distinction between analytic and synthetic follows that made by Sierpinska, Defence, Khatcherian, and Saldanha (1997) in discussing linear algebra. Similar distinctions have been made by Edwards (1997) using lexical and logical and by Freudenthal (1973) using constructive and descriptive. In considering defining as a mathematical activity in geometry, Rasmussen and Zandieh (2000) and de Villiers (1998) adopted Freudenthal's terminology. 7 Analytic definitions can, however, be inspired by regularities in the physical world, in which case a mathematical structure may be metaphorically represented in a physical situation. Vectors are useful in navigation because the motion of a sailboat (in part) "works like" vector addition.
appears to have a role to play throughout mathematics students' education, in mathematicians' practice, and in examinations of the nature of mathematics.
Validation in mathematics education. Holders of bachelor's degrees in mathematics are normally expected not only to know considerable mathematics content but also to be able to construct moderately complex proofs and to solve moderately nonroutine problems. Indeed, one major way that an individual's mathematical knowledge of a theorem is sometimes taken to be warranted is by the ability to "produce" a proof, not in a rote way but in the way a mathematician would produce it and with understanding (Rodd, 2000) . However, constructing or producing proofs is inextricably linked to the ability to validate them reliably, and a proof that could not be reliably validated would not provide much of a warrant. Solving moderately nonroutine problems also appears to call for abilities akin to validation, because one must ascertain whether a proposed solution is correct. In our ongoing investigation of mathematicians' views, we are finding that many mathematicians believe that checking the correctness of solutions ultimately depends on the same kind of deductive reasoning that is used in proofs and their validations.
Preservice secondary mathematics education majors and mathematics teachers also need to be able to validate proofs reliably because school mathematics curricula are likely to place increasing emphasis on proofs and problem solving (NCTM, 2000) . In this regard, Cuoco has observed informally but on the basis of considerable experience that "The best high school teachers are those who have a researchlike experience in mathematics" (2001, p. 171). And in an article in the Mathematics Teacher, Thompson (1996) suggests teaching indirect proof to high school students using number-theoretic statements that are similar to, although perhaps somewhat less complex than, the theorem used with undergraduates in our exploratory study.
Validation in the practice of mathematicians. In addition to being important for mathematics majors and mathematics teachers, validation appears to play a fundamental role in the production of new mathematics. A mathematician's belief in the reliability and unproblematic nature of validation provides the assurance needed to use a theorem in later work without repeatedly checking its correctness. That is, when a theorem is proved "it stays proved." This reliability seems to have been a major contributor to the rapid growth that has characterized 20th-century mathematics. Furthermore, many mathematicians seem to rely mainly on validation, sometimes carried out individually and sometimes in seminars, to learn new mathematics from the published research of others.
Validation within social constructivist (and other) perspectives. Our comments about the truth of theorems might suggest that we are taking a Platonist perspective, with its timeless abstract objects and absolute truth independent from human considerations. However, in this article, we are not favoring any single perspective on mathematics. Validation is a largely mental process with social origins and social consequences that bears examining relative to any of several views on the nature of mathematics. Furthermore, for many mathematicians, the truth of a theorem appears to be functionally just the existence of an argument that they personally (or their presumed surrogates) have validated and deemed to be a proof of that theorem. In particular, a further investigation of validation might be helpful in viewing mathematics from a social constructivist perspective-where mathematics is seen as an entirely social, fallible' phenomenon with the idea of truth replaced by social agreement and where abstract Platonic objects have no role (Ernest, 1998 ). An accurate description of how new mathematics is created is crucial from this perspective because, in a sense, how it is done is mathematics. We suspect that, if analyzed together, proofs and validations thereof might in the future play a larger role within a social constructivist perspective. In such an analysis, foundations and the kind of logic used could be treated as hidden, that is, tacitly assumed, premises of theorems. By examining the extent of agreement and the way it arises from the validation process, one might find a way to see mathematics as locally9 infallible and thereby reconcile this philosophical view with the more-or-less Platonic working views of most research mathematicians. Indeed, those working views may have emerged mainly from experience with the reliability of validation, rather than from any prior philosophical commitment.
Regardless of one's perspective on the nature of mathematics or its knowing, investigations of validation as a form of reading (and of the arguments being read), with emphasis on what validators do, could inform mathematics education. Our exploratory study is a start in this direction. We begin with an analysis of some specific arguments.
A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF A THEOREM AND FOUR "PROOFS"
In this section, we analyze a theorem and four undergraduate student-generated arguments purported to prove it. This analysis will provide concrete grounding for the above theoretical discussion of argument, proof, and validation, as well as for the subsequent description of our exploratory study of other undergraduate students' validations of these same four arguments. It may also expose aspects of these texts that might otherwise be missed. For example, we point out that certain portions of the first argument are extraneous and as such have no effect on its correctness as a proof. Nevertheless, errors in these extraneous portions were noted and thought to be important by some of our student validators.
The theorem and the four arguments are treated here primarily as texts, that is, as independent of specific authors and validators. We will, however, comment in general on how aspects of these texts may have come to be written or might affect readers, occasionally illustrating this point with comments from our student validators. The theorem is true and one of the arguments is a proof of it, whereas three 8 Here, following Ernest (1998), we mean by fallible something more than just the (generally accepted) human tendency to make mistakes.
9 By locally we mean the mathematics varies according to the foundations and logic used. For example, a mathematical constructivist would not accept the law of the excluded middle and, consequently, obtain different theorems than a mathematician who did accept the law of the excluded middle. We are not referring to geographic or social variations. are not; that is, as proofs they are incorrect. These characterizations-true, correct, proof-are widely regarded by mathematicians as global features of texts alone that can be determined without knowing who the authors or readers are. Mathematicians say that an argument proves a theorem, not that it proves it for Smith and possibly not for Jones, who are readers of the argument. This view is held despite the fact that the texts are the products of human activities, that their physical representations could not exist without authors, and that validators are required for anyone to know the theorem is true. Perhaps such assignments of proof, truth, and correctness (or their opposites) to texts is due to mathematicians' remarkably uniform agreement on whether these properties are associated with particular texts-at least at the level of the mathematics discussed here and modulo modest concerns about style or completeness.
Texts (and, more generally, language and communication) have been analyzed from several perspectives: syntactic structure (e.g., Chomsky, 1957), semantic structure (e.g., Fillmore, 1968; Kintsch, 1974) , and language in use (Halliday, 1977; Vachek, 1966) . Relevant ideas emphasizing language in use that are especially applicable to mathematical texts have been summarized and illustrated by Morgan (1996) . These ideas include such features as the ways reasoning is expressed (e.g., because, so), the symmetry or asymmetry of the relationship between authors and readers, and what texts might suggest about the nature of mathematics. Most of these features, for example the use of "we" in mathematical texts (Pimm, 1984) , have no bearing on whether an argument proves a theorem; and in our experience, undergraduate students realize this and concentrate on the underlying mathematical concepts and inferences. Thus, we provide a different kind of textual analysis, one that is a kind of lineby-line gloss, or elaboration, of the theorem and the four student-generated arguments emphasizing mathematical and logical points that a validator might, or might not, notice. For example, in considering the statement of the theorem, we discuss both its logical structure and other, more informal, ways that it could be written. For the four student-generated arguments, we discuss such matters as the use of alternative terms (e.g., assume for suppose, divides instead of multiple), the role of individual sentences in furthering the argument, proper and improper uses of symbols, implicit assumptions (e.g., that a division of the argument into cases is exhaustive), the correctness of inferences, computational errors, extraneous statements, and structural aspects of the argument. Global properties, such as whether an argument proves the theorem, as opposed to some other theorem, are also discussed.
In the following analyses, the names of the four arguments (e.g., "Proof (a)": Errors Galore) and the numbering of their parts are for the convenience of the reader; the names and numbering were not shown to the eight student validators in our study. The theorem to be proved was this: THEOREM: For any positive integer n, if n2 is a multiple of 3, then n is a multiple of 3.
Both the student authors of the four arguments and the student validators in our empirical study were given this statement of the theorem. It is a formal statement in that the variable n, the set to which it refers (the positive integers), and the universal quantification, any, are explicitly stated, and the conditional is expressed in its most common form, if. ..., then. However, other, less formal statements of this theorem convey the same logical information; their equivalence can be established using logic and little or no additional mathematical content. Often, theorems that undergraduate students at this level consider are stated in a less formal way. For example, one informal statement of this theorem is A positive integer is a multiple of 3 whenever its square is.
Undergraduate students similar to the ones in our empirical study appear to have considerable difficulty interpreting informal statements of theorems and converting them to formal ones (Selden & Selden, 1995) . In our experience, formal statements appear to be the ones most easily interpreted in validations; they correspond to what we have called proof frameworks. These consist of the beginning and end of a proof-the part that can be written without knowing the meanings of all of the mathematical terms and from which the theorem can be reconstructed. It is an understanding (usually tacit) of the relationship between statements of theorems and their proof frameworks that allows validators to decide if an argument proves the theorem at hand as opposed to some other theorem. A proof framework'" for this theorem is this: PROOF. Let n be a positive integer and suppose n2 is a multiple of 3. ... Then n is a multiple of 3. Often the introduction of a variable, for example, "Let n be a positive integer," is omitted but understood. This omission usually occurs when the variable appears in the statement of the theorem, as it does here. Our earlier work (Selden & Selden, 1995) suggests that, among the various possible ways to state a theorem, student validators should find the more formal statement used here the easiest to correctly connect with arguments purporting to prove it.
In what follows, we state each student-generated argument verbatim and then give our line-by-line analysis of it. "Proof (a)": Errors Galore PROOF. Assume that n2 is an odd positive integer that is divisible by 3. That is n2 = (3n +1)2 = 9n2+ 6n +1 = 3n(n + 2) + 1. Therefore, n2 is divisible by 3. Assume that n2 is even and a multiple of 3. That is, n2 = (3n)2 = 9n2 = 3n(3n). Therefore, n2 is a multiple of 3. If we factor n2 = 9n2, we get 3n(3n); which means that n is a multiple of 3. U Analysis of "Proof (a)"
[ 1] Assume that n2 is an odd positive integer that is divisible by 3. This part of the argument is not wrong. In this context one can take assume to mean suppose, and an author of a proof can suppose any reasonable non-selfcontradictory statement which might aid the progress of the argument. But, as some of our student validators noted, this division into odd and even cases is a peculiar way to structure a proof of this particular theorem. It is peculiar because odd and even appear to be unrelated to multiples of 3.
That the phrase "n2 is divisible by 3" is an equivalent way of saying "n2 is a multiple of 3" is something a validator would need to assent to (by noting that the definitions of divisibility and multiple are mathematically equivalent). One student validator, whom we refer to in this article as SW, briefly noted (and assented to) the fact that "divisible by 3" was used here; subsequently, in the even case, "multiple of 3" was used.
[2] That is n2 = (3n + 1)2 = 9n2 + 6n + 1 = 3n(n + 2) + 1. There are four errors here. First, the assumption of oddness was about n2, not n, to which it is apparently being applied (i.e., n = 3n + 1). Second, n is being used in two places with two different meanings within one equation; in effect, the author is mistakenly asserting that n = 3n + 1. In the genre of mathematical proofs, it is not permissible to let the same symbol represent two different numbers except across independent subproofs. Doing so would be very likely to cause validators confusion. Indeed, student ST remarked that "all those n's trying to equal each other" misled her. Third, an odd integer n can be represented as n = 2m + 1, not as 3m + 1, where m is a different integer from n. Fourth, the last equation is incorrect; 3n times n yields 3n2, not 9n2.
We would like to comment further on the author's apparent idea that 3n + 1 can represent a general odd number. We doubt that this idea indicates a more-or-less fixed misconception in the author's knowledge base, but rather suspect it is an incorrect, partial recollection of the idea that 2n + 1 is odd for integer values of n. There appears to be a more subtle lack in the author's knowledge, and we will offer a conjecture of its nature and how it occurs. Students of mathematics probably recognize (mostly tacitly) many kinds of problems and tasks, and each kind may be associated with many other ideas, forming a mental structure like a concept image (Tall & Vinner, 1981) for that problem or task-what we have called a problem-situation image. When a kind of problem or task is recognized, an associated problemsituation image may be activated (brought to mind) or partly activated (Baddeley, 1995) . In particular, accomplished students might associate the task of representing a general odd number with a feeling of caution about getting the representation right. As they execute the task, this feeling of caution may engender checking. In the case at hand, that might mean substituting some numbers for n: substituting 1 for n (in 3n + 1) yields 4 and indicates that 3n + 1 need not be odd. We suspect that the author's problem-situation image(s) for this task did not include an appropriate feeling of caution. A mechanism for bringing something to mind similar to the one sketched here, concerning how to start solving a recognized kind of problem, has been more fully described in Selden, Selden, Hauk, & Mason (2000).
[3] Therefore, n2 is divisible by 3. It was assumed in [1] that n2 is divisible by 3. Thus, this statement cannot be wrong despite the intervening errors in [2]; however, it cannot be of use either. Furthermore, this statement completes one of two inde-pendent subproofs, one for n2 odd and one for n2 even, and should have ended with n as a multiple of 3, not n2.
The errors in [2] might be called extraneous errors. Because they do not affect the correctness of [3] , they cannot affect whether or not the argument is a proof. Such errors are nevertheless undesirable because they can make arguments confusing and more difficult to validate. In our empirical study, most student validators spent considerable time trying to decipher [2], making comments like "3n + 1 doesn't make sense [for odd]," but did not seem to notice its irrelevance.
[4] Assume that n2 is even and a multiple of 3. This assumption is an appropriate beginning of the second independent subproof (case). However, as already noted under [1], this division into cases, although not wrong, is unlikely to be useful.
[5] That is n2 = (3n)2 = 9n2 = 3n(3n). In the first equation n2 = (3n)2, it appears that the assumption that n2 is a multiple of 3 is incorrectly applied to n instead of n2. Also, in the implicit equation n = 3n, once again the right-hand n does not have the same meaning as the left-hand n. To indicate that n is a multiple of 3, one represents n as 3m, where m is another positive integer. The second and third equations are correct.
[6] Therefore, n2 is a multiple of 3. This conclusion is not incorrect; it does follow from [5] (if one replaces all but the first "n" with "m's" ). But it also just repeats the assumption in [4], which is not likely to be useful.
[7] Ifwefactor n2 = 9n2, we get 3n(3n). Here the author appears to be attempting to restate information from [5], which could not introduce any new errors. Since the word "factor" refers to expressions, not equations, we take it that [7] is a shortened form of "Now n2 = 9n2, and if we factor 9n2, we get 3n(3n)."
[8] which means that n is a multiple of 3. U This inference from [7] is not correct even if we change 3n(3n) to 3m(3m). To conclude that n is a multiple of 3, one would expect to see 3 as a factor of n, not as a factor of n2. The symbol "N" is one of those customarily used to indicate the end of a proof.
In summary, this argument is not a proof. It consists of two independent subarguments each of which should end with "n is a multiple of 3" or its equivalent, "n is divisible by 3." However, the odd case did not end this way, and the even case made this claim but did not properly justify it. It is left implicit that the two cases are exhaustive, that is, that every integer is either even or odd, but it is customary to leave such a well-known fact implicit.
We would like to mention two kinds of global errors that this argument does not contain. First, although the argument has a high density of errors, they are not what one might call mathematically syntactical errors (Selden & Selden, 1987) . The mathematical terms and symbols fit together in a meaningful way (i.e., one can judge whether each individual statement is correct or incorrect). Second, the two subarguments really are independent. Occasionally, one finds arguments in which an inference in one subargument improperly depends on information from inside another supposedly independent subargument, and that error did not occur here.
Last, we have taken this argument at face value; that is, we have assumed that the author meant to write a proof and had some more-or-less clear (although incorrect) conception of how the argument would proceed. However, because the student author submitted this "proof' as part of a take-home test, it is possible that he or she was merely seeking some (partial) credit and was thus working in what Vinner (1997) has called a pseudoconceptual mode," mimicking some previously encountered argument about multiples of 2. One possible similar argument might have been the following proof of the statement: For any integer n, n2 is a multiple of 2 if and only if n is a multiple of 2.
PROOF. If n is odd, then n2 = (2k + 1)2 = 4k2 + 4k+1 = 2(2k2 + 2k) + 1, which is odd. Therefore, if n2 is a multiple of 2, then n is a multiple of 2. Now, if n is a multiple of 2, that is, if n is even, then n2 = (2k)2 = 4k2 = 2(2k2), which is a multiple of 2. M "Proof (b)": The Real Thing PROOF. Suppose to the contrary that n is not a multiple of 3. We will let 3k be a positive integer that is a multiple of 3, so that 3k + 1 and 3k + 2 are integers that are not multiples of 3. Now n2 = (3k + 1)2 = 9k2 + 6k + 1 = 3(3k2 + 2k) + 1. Since 3(3k2 + 2k) is a multiple of 3, 3(3k2 + 2k) + 1 is not. Now we will do the other possibility, 3k + 2. So, n2 = (3k + 2)2 = 9k2 + 12k + 4 = 3(3k2 + 4k + 1) + 1 is not a multiple of 3. Because n2 is not a multiple of 3, we have a contradiction. E Analysis of "Proof (b)"
[1] Suppose to the contrary that n is not a multiple of 3. The phrase "to the contrary" may indicate that this argument is meant to be a proof by contradiction. It might also indicate that the argument will prove the contrapositive of the theorem, that is, that the negation of the conclusion implies the negation of the hypothesis, which is logically equivalent to the theorem. The student author may not be clear about the distinction. If the proof is really by contradiction, it is implicit that n represents a positive integer and n2 is assumed to be a multiple of 3. The argument can end with any contradiction, but that contradiction could be to the hypothesis, that is, n2 is not a multiple of 3. If the contrapositive of the theorem is being proved, it is implicit only that n represents a positive integer, and the argument must end with n2 is not a multiple of 3. For both methods of proof it is appropriate to suppose the negation of the conclusion, that is, n is not a multiple of 3, as is done here.
[2] We will let 3k be a positive integer that is a multiple of 3, so that 3k + 1 and 3k + 2 are integers that are not multiples of 3. This representation and division into cases correctly follows from the fact that any positive integer can be represented as exactly one of 3k, 3k + 1, or 3k + 2 for some positive integer k. It is implicit that the positive integer being represented is n and that, according to [1], n cannot equal 3k; thus, n must equal 3k + 1 or 3k + 2. A validator would need to check that this statement is correct. To comprehend [2], it would not be essential to see the implicit representation of n as one of the three expressions, but it would be in order to comprehend [3] .
[3] Now n2 = (3k + 1)2 = 9k2 + 6k + 1 = 3(3k2 + 2k) + 1. This statement begins the first of two independent, "parallel" subarguments. Assuming that n = 3k + 1, all of the equations are correct.
[ 4 By a validator assenting to something, in this case that 3(3k2 + 2k) + 1 is not a multiple of 3, we mean that the validator is conscious of agreeing with it. This conscious agreement may be fleeting and not focused on, but it is distinct from mere passive reading in inner speech. It may be the only conscious phenomenon associated with a fairly complex inference. In this case, the validator must have some knowledge of the relationship between multiples and multiples plus one to see that 3(3k2 + 2k) + 1 fits that relationship and infer that 3(3k2 + 2k) + 1 is not a multiple of 3. While the assenting is conscious, the inference leading to it may occur very quickly and outside of consciousness. It would be a validation error for a validator to passively read, rather than assent to or reject, a portion of a proof, even if the proof were correct and the validator agreed that it was correct. Such a validator would not have tested that portion of the proof and could not really know that the proof was correct.
[5] Now we will do the other possibility, 3k + 2. This assertion indicates that the first subargument is finished and that the second subargument is beginning with the correct, but implicit, assumption that n = 3k + 2.
[6] So, n2 = (3k + 2)2 = 9k2 + 12k + 4 = 3(3k2 + 4k + 1) + 1 is not a multiple of 3. All of the equations are correct. The final assertion depends on the same information used to justify [4] and should be assented to by a validator. This statement concludes the second subargument.
[7] Because n2 is not a multiple of 3, we have a contradiction. M This statement is correct, assuming that it is a proof by contradiction. The implicit reasoning is that, according to [2], one of the two subarguments (cases) must apply to n2. Because both subarguments yield that n2 is not a multiple of 3, there is a contradiction to the implicit assumption that n2 is a multiple of 3. If this argument were treated as a proof of the contrapositive, it would be peculiar to mention "the contrary" in [1]. However, under that interpretation, this final step could be omitted entirely or replaced by "Thus, in either case, n2 is not a multiple of 3." We regard this argument as a proof of the theorem, although it might be written more clearly. If the role of n2 and the division into two independent subarguments (cases) were [1] Let n be an integer such that n2 = 3x where x is an integer. Except for the omission of the word "positive," this representation is an appropriate way to begin a proof of this theorem. However, it is very abbreviated, and for mathematics at this level, the argument would be more clearly linked to the theorem by supposing that n2 is a multiple of 3 before claiming n2 = 3x, where x is an integer.
[2] Then 31 n2. This inference is correct, but not likely to be useful. It is read "3 divides n2" and is just another way of saying n2 = 3x, where x is an integer, which was the supposition in [1].
[3] Since n2 = 3x, nn = 3x. The inference is not wrong, but it is still just the information of [1] written in a slightly different form.
[4] Thus, 31n. Read "3 divides n," this statement means that n is a multiple of 3. All four of the undergraduate student-generated arguments above correctly use a logical and rhetorical device that is particularly common in the genre of mathematical proofs. That is, to prove a theorem claiming some property about all (each) of the elements in some set, for example, about all positive integers, it is sufficient to argue about a particular, but arbitrary, element of the set. In the language of secondary school algebra, one might say that the argument is made about an unknown constant rather than a variable. Typically, the element is named very early in the argument to avoid the possibility of inadvertently compromising its arbitrariness. At the conclusion of the argument, it is implicit that whichever element of the set might be of interest, the argument could have been about that element. Although this rhetorical device is simple, it is very powerful and simplifies the logic required of validators, thereby perhaps avoiding some errors. In the historical development of calculus, this device together with carefully formulated, analytic definitions (like the epsilon-delta definition of limit) allowed theorems about motion (for centuries a difficult concept) and, in particular, about rate of change, to have proofs in which nothing changes and motion is not mentioned.
The textual analysis above differs from a description of actual validations. It provides background information about the theorem and the four "proofs" useful for understanding validations of them. However, it does not include descriptions of actual validators' mental processes, abilities, missteps, and so on, in their attempts to determine which of the arguments are really proofs. We now describe how some undergraduate mathematics and mathematics education majors judged whether these same four arguments were proofs.
THE EXPLORATORY STUDY OF VALIDATION
Eight undergraduates (four secondary education mathematics majors and four mathematics majors) at a comprehensive state university in the United States were interviewed individually outside of class in the 4th and 5th weeks of a 15-week "bridge" or "transition to proofs" course. Although this course is normally studied in the 2nd or 3rd year at university, three of the eight students were in their 4th year. The eight formed the entire cohort of this learning-to-prove-theorems course required of all mathematics and secondary mathematics education majors at the institution. The goal of such courses, offered by many U.S. mathematics departments, is to help students make the transition from an earlier traditional calculus sequence to later, more proof-based courses, such as abstract algebra and real analysis. They typically cover various aspects of logic; a little about sets, relations, and functions; proof by mathematical induction; and perhaps a few additional topics, such as elementary number theory or introductory graph theory, about which students are asked to prove theorems. The emphasis is on having students learn to make their own proofs as opposed to the amount of mathematics covered. Kurtz's Foundations ofAbstract Mathematics (1992), a typical textbook, was used in the course. In addition, students were to spend much of their class time, in pairs, proving theorems at the chalkboard. All eight students had taken single-variable calculus; some had also taken multivariable calculus, differential equations, matrix algebra, or discrete structures. One student (referred to as BH) was concurrently enrolled in a dual-listed graduate/undergraduate number theory course.
The Structure of the Interviews
Each student was interviewed individually for about 1 hour in a semistructured manner using an interview script consisting of four phases. Phase 1. During this phase, which could be termed the warm-up phase, each student was given a brief fact sheet (see Appendix 1) and this written statement: For any positive integer n, if n2 is divisible by 3, then n is divisible by 3. They were asked to explain in their own words what the statement said, to give some examples of it, and to decide whether it was true and how they would know. Finally, they were asked to give a proof of the statement if they could. Two successfully did so. After some time had elapsed, those who could not complete a proof were advised that they need not continue, because proving the theorem was not the point of the interview; rather, they were to judge the correctness of other students' "proofs" of the statement. Students were told that since some of the "proofs" they would see might seem a bit unusual, having attempted a proof would help them appreciate the variety of approaches taken.
Phase 2. Each student was shown the four "proofs," one after the other, and asked to think out loud as they read each one and decided whether it was, or was not, a proof. If it was not a proof, they were to point out which part(s) were problematic. If they could, they were to say where, or in what ways, the purported proof had gone wrong. They were also informed that these "proofs" had been submitted as part of a take-home test in a previous year by transition-course students like themselves. The four "proofs" were presented to the students as they appear in Appendix 2.
They were told to take as long as they liked and seemed not to be hurried. For example, one student (JB) spent 15 minutes reading and rereading the first "proof' before deciding (incorrectly) that it was indeed a proof, except for a minor notational error. Several of the students did not want to commit themselves and were allowed during this phase to say that they were unsure whether a given argument was, or was not, a proof. Phase 3. Having seen and thought about all four "proofs" one after the other, the students were then given an opportunity to reread them all together and rethink their earlier decisions with an opportunity to change their minds, and some did. At the end of this phase, they were not allowed to say that they were unsure, but were asked to make a decision and declare whether each argument was, or was not, a proof. Phase 4. Finally, the students were asked eight general questions about proofs and how they read, understand, and validate proofs.
The data collected consisted of the audiotaped interviews, the interviewer's notes, and the students' work on the "proof' sheets provided during the interview. (See Appendix 2 for details.) The Conduct of the Interviews The interviews were treated as "teaching interviews." Not only was the interviewer the instructor for the transition course that the students were taking, it also seemed appropriate and opportune to the interviewer-instructor to answer their implicit and explicit questions. The interviewer would respond generally about the structure or style of written proofs but never indicate whether the four specific arguments that the students were examining were actually proofs of the theorem. This procedure kept the tone of the interviews as relaxed and conversational as possible.
In addition, as the interviews proceeded, the students sometimes seemed to need encouragement to keep reading and thinking about the four "proofs." Thus, to obtain as much information as possible, the interviewer intermittently made comments and answered or asked questions to keep students on task. All the students seemed to take the interviews seriously and seemed genuinely engaged with the task at hand.
Informing students of mathematical practices and norms. Keeping the students on task occasionally had the effect of suggesting to them practices and norms of the wider mathematics community. In the following excerpt, student MM has just begun to consider "Proof (a)" for the first time. She examines it silently for 1 minute, then asks whether another 3 should be in the expression 3n(n + 2) + 1. With encouragement from the interviewer, she makes her suggested correction, writing 9n2 + 6n + 1 = 3n(3n + 2) + 1. She then continues reading silently for an additional 30 seconds. Then, the following interchange occurs. The norm12 being suggested here is that stylistic clarity (i.e., writing proofs in a nonconfusing way) is valued, but that lack of clarity in itself does not make an argument incorrect. In addition, it is implied through the overt act of correcting an algebraic error that small errors in written proofs (e.g., those similar to misprints) can be fixed during the validation process.
In the following example, student ST is in the midst of considering "Proof (a) In this excerpt, ST comments on the confusion caused by using n in several different ways. The interviewer corroborates this and gives an additional bit of information regarding when it is permissible to use the same letter, such as n, again. This, and other similar comments made during the interviews, had the effect of introducing these students to some stylistic features of written proofs at the same time as the students saw (for themselves) a rationale for those bits of mathematical practice.
Further reflection encouraged by the interviewer's remarks. All students were kept on task by the interviewer's deliberate attempts to probe their thinking. We illustrate this procedure with comments from KC, a particularly expressive and responsive student. She told the interviewer that she ordinarily likes to read proofs aloud to herself, that is, she had no problem converting inner speech to regular speech during the interview. Below is a condensed version of her first attempt at validating "Proof (d)." It proceeded along a tortuous sequence of meandering stages, numbered 1-8 below, apparently assisted by the interviewer's probing questions. (For the entire transcript, see Appendix 3.) 1. KC reads the entire proof aloud slowly once and remarks that "Proof (d)" looks a lot like "Proof (a)" and says, "I think that's a proof." 2. On being questioned by the interviewer who is genuinely surprised by this analogy, she explains something about 3(3m2) and tries to rewrite that portion of the proof, concentrating on the form she wants to see, "three times some integer." 3. After some time, the interviewer asks whether that is good enough for a proof 12 This kind of norm (of the wider mathematical community) is reminiscent of sociomathematical norms, the negotiation of which has been investigated in classroom settings, for example, at the undergraduate level by Yackel, Rasmussen, and King (2000). It would be interesting to investigate how such norms are maintained and, in particular, adopted by novices in the wider mathematical community. The kinds of discussions associated with these interviews may not occur often enough in university courses to explain the maintenance of such norms. now, and KC comments that her wording may not be right. She and the interviewer discuss this at some length and agree there are lots of equivalent ways to word things. 4. The interviewer then asks whether she has finished, and KC responds with an explanation, ". .. Let's see, they showed that m was a multiple of 3 but they didn't show n was a multiple of 3." 5. She tries to substitute back in and then suddenly blurts out, "OK, wait, wait ...," followed by 30 seconds of intense silent concentration. She then thumps her pencil twice emphatically on the desk and asserts, "I don't think that's a proof." 6. The interviewer asks why she changed her mind, and KC says, '"They showed that m was a multiple of 3, but they didn't show n was a multiple of 3." 7. The interviewer then asks, "Where did that m come from anyhow?" to which KC responds, ". .. they let n = 3m right up here.. ." [looking back to the beginning of the argument], and notes that they did not start in the right place, that is, n2 = 3m. 8. She reiterates, "I don't think that's a proof."
In responding to the interviewer at stages (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7), KC is encouraged to reflect further on "Proof (d)" and notices features of the argument that went undetected earlier. However, it is not easy to conjecture what happened to KC during the 30 seconds of intense silent concentration at stage (5). Her insight cannot reasonably be attributed to anything specific that the interviewer did; she appears to have had something like a genuine "Aha!" experience (Barnes, 2000) .
It would be very interesting to know what KC was conscious of during this experience. We suspect such an experience might be described immediately after its occurrence, but is often not well remembered later. The interviewer did question KC immediately about why she changed her mind, but not about the contents of her conscious experience. To have done so might have considerably altered the overall validation process.
Overall Results
On analyzing the data, it became clear that most students made a judgment regarding the correctness of each "proof" at four different times, namely, at the beginning and at the end of each of two readings (in Phases 2 and 3). These times were labeled Time 1 through Time 4. All students, except JB, maintained or increased the number of their correct judgments from Time 1 to Time 4. (See Figure 1 , which displays the changing number of correct judgments by each student across time.) For example, KC gradually improved from one correct judgment at Time 1 to four correct judgments at Time 4. This improvement appears to be the result of further reflection.
Eight students were interviewed regarding the four "proofs," making a total of 32 person-proof judgments. Table 1 gives the percentage of correct judgments made at the various times. Note. The total number of judgments was 32.
What happened over time that might have caused students to change their minds? During the second phase of the interview, between Time 1 and Time 2, the interviewer asked and answered questions, encouraging the student validators to reflect further. By the beginning of the third phase of the interview, they had seen and pondered all four "proofs" and were more experienced. At Time 4, the interviewer would no longer accept "unsure," and the students made their final judgment for each "proof."
At Time 1, less than half (46%) of the students' judgments were correct. This remarkable fact suggests that given this task on a test, where no one would have been encouraging them to reflect further, the students would probably have done about as well by chance.3 They initially made the most correct judgments on "Proof (b)," with five correctly stating that it was a proof and three being unsure. They also initially made the fewest correct judgments on "Proof (d)," with only two making the correct judgment and four incorrectly stating it was a proof. This difficulty with "Proof (d)" supports our observation below that the students were primarily checking local details instead of looking for global/structural difficulties. After the first sentence, "Proof (d)" can be regarded as an argument for the converse, modulo one notational error. The students also seemed to be relying on their feelings of understanding in a way that sometimes misled them. Student MM 13 Although the students' ability to determine whether these arguments were proofs appeared to be very limited, we are not claiming this is unchangeable. Indeed, we saw some evidence of improved judgments even during the course of the interviews and conjecture that the students' initial lack of ability was largely due to a lack of appropriate experiences.
commented about "Proof (d)" that she "liked it" and could "see it better than the rest." Table 2 shows how the aggregated students' judgments on the four purported proofs changed over time. The entries represent numbers of students. A clear trend can be seen for "Proof (b)" and "Proof (d)"; when comparing Time 1 with Time 4, all students' judgments improved or stayed the same. However, the data for "Proof (a)" and "Proof (c)" are more complex. For example, on "Proof (a)" the improvement from four correct judgments at Time 1 to five at Time 4 resulted from two students changing to correct judgments and one student changing to an incorrect judgment.
In general, the students considerably improved their judgments over time (even though this was neither the purpose nor the expectation of the interviewer). Furthermore, this improvement seems largely to have been due to interactions with the interviewer that somehow enhanced the way that these students used the experiences and knowledge that they brought to the task. This phenomenon appears similar to occurrences in the zone of proximal development that were described by Vygotsky (1978) in studying the sociocognitive development of children. It would be interesting to know more about such student-interviewer interactions when the interviewer's purpose was to enhance a student's mathematical practices. For example, small portions of these interviews might be seen as dialectical situations that allowed the interviewer to suggest certain aspects of the practices and norms of the wider mathematical community. In other portions of the interviews, a small comment or question apparently induced a student to refocus his or her attention on another part of the task (i.e., on another part of the argument being validated). Student BH, who had successfully proved the theorem earlier in the interview after a false start, thought that the conclusion in "Proof (a)" was being assumed in the even case. That is, she apparently ignored [4] and wrongly interpreted [5] to include the implicit supposition that n = 3m. On reading further, she concluded that the converse had been proved. She stated " ... [they're] doing it the way I wanted to," suggesting that her initial failed attempt to prove the result influenced her to incorrectly see her own misstep in the argument. Only BH and ST had succeeded in proving the theorem earlier in the interview; they were also the only students who correctly stated that the converse had been shown in "Proof (d)." These sorts of structural comments were rare. Thus, as one might expect, the experience of proving a theorem can have positive effects on subsequent validations of other arguments for the same theorem. And, perhaps counterintuitively, such earlier experiences can sometimes have negative effects on validations, as described above when BH seems to have been more influenced by an early false start on a proof than by her later success.
What the Students Said as

What the Students Said They Did When Reading Proofs
Most students seemed content to attempt a careful line-by-line check to see whether each mathematical assertion followed from previous assertions. When queried (in Phase 4) about what they do when reading a proof, the students said they did many things: They made sure all steps were logical and looked to see that everything was supported. They checked the computations and whether anything was left out. They said, "[I] take it step by step; [I] like to read it real slow" and "I go through more than once. ... See if from step to step, it follows." Several students said that they would try to go through a proof with an example, but few gave evidence of doing so during their validations. KC, whose validation of "Proof (d)" was paraphrased above, said, "[It's] not like reading a newspaper; more understanding is involved. I go through more than once. Something will come out at me that didn't the first time." When queried about how she tells that a proof is not correct, KC explained, "because they didn't show it and they didn't say it [meaning 
Making Sense as a Criterion for Determining Correctness of Proofs
In general, for these students, a feeling of understanding or not-that is, of making sense or not-seemed to be an important criterion when making a judgment about the correctness of these four "proofs." For them, it seemed a question of whether the written text, together with their efforts at comprehension, engendered a personal feeling of understanding. For example, after initially reading through "Proof (a)" slowly, JB concentrated on the last statement, n2 = 9n2, reiterating several times that it did not make sense. Then he said, "I'm saying I don't think this is a proof because it [n2 = 9n2] doesn't make sense." After the interviewer suggested that perhaps the author had meant to write n2 = 9m2, JB concurred and continued his validation attempt for some time, finally deciding incorrectly it was a proof "after variable renaming." Although the judgment was incorrect, it is clear that JB's main focus was on making sense, perhaps residing in the form of some conscious, but unarticulated, feeling of understanding.
When KC first came to the gap in "Proof (c)," she reread the argument several times and tried to expand on it (on paper). When she could not, she explained her thinking to the interviewer, as follows. KC: Maybe I just don't understand the concept of... I ... ,I understand 3 divides n2 I understand all that stuff, but I don't . At this point, a sense of not understanding makes KC cautious about whether the argument is a proof. Another student, MM, in summing up her final judgments, wrote under "Proof (c)" that it was not a proof and "I don't understand the reasoning." Then, under "Proof (d)," she wrote an asterisk followed by "Proofthis one is the easiest for me to understand." However, this argument is not a proof of the theorem, but rather a proof of its converse. In her case, a feeling of understanding did not mean the argument was correctly linked (via a proof framework) to the theorem.
The students also indicated (in Phase 4) that they usually read proofs for understanding. Student BH, who was taking number theory concurrently, said "It's got to be true but got to make sense. Last night I was lost 20 minutes in number theory. I found somebody's thesis in the library. Just one step [was missing].... " This comment suggests that the feeling of making sense, or of understanding, is a matter of considerable importance to BH-important enough to search through theses in the library. Student KC, commenting on her previous calculus textbook, said, "Some of the proofs in the calc book were 'off the wall.' I had to sit and write them up; [I had to] go home and see where the things were coming from." For these students, understanding was required of them when reading proofs. When given a proof by an instructor or in a textbook, they quite reasonably assumed that it was correct. Indeed, they probably had very little previous practice in deciding whether "proofs" are correct, that is, in validation. Thus, they appear to have depended on their wider personal experiences of understanding, which did not always serve them well in validation. This unreliability may occur because a feeling of understanding itself and one's tendency to rely on it are influenced and sharpened by experiences in validation-experiences these students largely lacked. Also, although the students spoke of understanding quite freely, they apparently did not always mean more or less the same thing by it. Their responses to questions in Phase 4, together with their validation attempts, suggest that they had a range of meanings for understanding from verifying short computations in a text using their own procedural knowledge to a feeling of understanding associated with a gestalt view of an entire argument. Perhaps this variation is due to a general difficulty in negotiating meaning for concepts such as understanding, which do not refer to underlying physical objects (e.g., cars or basketballs).
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING
What students say about how they read proofs seems to be a poor indicator of whether they can actually validate proofs with reasonable reliability. They tend to "talk a good line." They say that they check proofs step by step, follow arguments logically, generate examples, and make sure the ideas in a proof make sense. However, their first reading judgments (see Table 1 , Time 1) yield no better than chance results, suggesting that they cannot reliably implement their intentions.
On the other hand, even without explicit instruction, the reflection and reconsideration engendered by the interview process eventually yielded 81% correct judgments (see Table 1 , Time 4). This improvement suggests that instruction in validation could be effective. The interviews also suggest that students should be encouraged to attend more to possible global/structural errors, for example, proving the converse of the statement. In particular, students need to devote attention to what we have called proof frameworks (Selden & Selden, 1995) , a topic that we suspect is relatively easy to master because it does not depend on a deep understanding of the mathematical concepts involved in the statement of a theorem.
Validation of proofs is part of the implicit curriculum, but it is a largely invisible mental process. Few university teachers try to teach it explicitly, although some may admonish students to "read with pencil and paper in hand" or the like. This advice is at best descriptive, but certainly not usefully prescriptive, so students tend to interpret such vague directions idiosyncratically, spotting mainly local notational and computational difficulties. They appear to be substituting their feeling of overall understanding, plus a focus on surface features, for validation. We suspect such a feeling of overall understanding is useful and reliable for mathematicians who will have included in it their notion of correctness, but is often unreliable and misleading for students.
"Bridge" courses in the United States tend to give students some idea of the logical structure of theorems, covering such topics as direct and indirect proofs and indicating that the converse is not logically equivalent to a theorem. These courses also cover some logic, set theory, functions, and assorted other topics. Often, the material on logic precedes student work with proofs, and perhaps for that reason, tends to be presented in an abstract, decontextualized way that may not be very effective. Textbooks for such courses have from none to just a few to a moderate number of exercises that involve the critiquing of "proofs." The directions vary; students may be asked to (a) find the fallacy in a "proof'; (b) tell whether a "proof' is correct; (c) grade a "proof," A for correct, C for partially correct, or F; or (d) evaluate both a "proof' and a "counterexample." Most of these "proofs" have been carefully constructed by textbook authors so there is just one error to detect. For example, in Smith, Eggen, and St. Andre (1990; p. 39) we find the following "proof to grade": Suppose m is an integer. Claim. If m2 is odd, then m is odd. "Proof." Assume m is odd. Then m = 2k + 1 for some integer k. Therefore, m2 = (2k + 1)2 = 4k2 + 4k + 1 = 2(2k2 + 2k) + 1, which is odd. Therefore, if m2 is odd, then m is odd. E The "proof' above does not present a student with anywhere near the complexity or kinds of difficulties seen in our student-generated arguments.'4 Consideration of such contrived "proofs" is no doubt valuable practice for those beginning to learn validation. However, we suggest that additional practice in validating such actual student "proofs" as those in this study, together with small-group discussion, could be beneficial, especially for preservice secondary teachers who one day may need to judge the correctness of their own students' proofs or novel solutions to problems.
FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
One might consider the students in our empirical study as novices at validation and ask what experts-advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and mathematicians-would do. The students in our study could not reliably validate relatively short purported proofs of a simple theorem, but mathematicians can. At some point, therefore, mathematics students learn to do so. When does this happen, and through what kinds of experiences is the process of validation learned?
Proofs of the theorem used in this study do not seem to have a very complex structure. What would happen if one considered a theorem whose proof was inherently more complex or where the potential for more subtle errors was greater? Students often have views of proof (Harel & Sowder, 1998 ) that differ markedly from mathematicians' views. How would such views be influenced by attempts to increase students' ability to validate proofs?
How does the ability to validate proofs relate to the ability to construct them? How does it relate to a knowledge of logic, especially when taught in the rather formal, symbolic, decontextualized way that is found in many transition courses? What are students' perceived and actual criteria for correctness, for example, that they agree the calculations are legitimate, that they can follow the argument line by line, that they can see why the argument begins where it does, and so on? The students in this study were sometimes misled by a feeling of overall understanding, whereas mathematicians can use such feelings beneficially. What accounts for the difference? How does one learn to have a feeling at the "right time" and not otherwise? What parts of validations consist of reading plus assent, without additional conscious experiences, such as inner speech or vision or feeling? What kind of teaching might promote a correct use of assent during validation?
Here, after introducing the idea of validation, we discussed its nature in a way that depended on information we take to be common knowledge among most mathematicians. However, without additional investigations, there is no way to be sure that we are right about what is common knowledge or that the common knowledge itself is correct. Taking much of this discussion as partly conjectural yields a number of additional research questions. For example, suppose one recorded what was being attended to during the construction of a proof and extracted, in order, those parts that appeared in its final form. Would this order, as we have suggested, differ greatly from the order of the final proof? In teaching, one of us has sometimes encouraged students to write a proof framework, that is, the beginning and ending few lines of a proof, before attempting the middle. Some students resist this advice, and it would be interesting to investigate whether such students have more difficulty constructing proofs than others.
We have also alluded to mathematicians' ability to agree on the correctness of proofs and the truth of theorems and that they can often decide this individually and believe "you do not vote on the truth of theorems." It would be interesting to investigate the degree to which these are the perceptions of mathematicians as well as the degree to which those perceptions are accurate. Information about such perceptions and abilities might enhance the role played by validation in social constructivist views of mathematics.
Last, what is a good way to teach validation? Is it a concept like proof or definition, which is perhaps best learned through experiences, such as finding and discussing errors in actual student "proofs"?
